Eating Pure and True: Halal Businesses inChina

Food safety has always been problematic inChina. After the 2008 milk scandal, in which an estimated 300,000 babies weremade ill from contaminated milk that was reported to contain melamine, demandsfrom society have driven the food industry to implement further scrutiny.Reporting on food safety violations has rocketed in recent years, thus makingmany people seek safer food options with either imports or local alternatives.Domestically, halal food has become an especially common alternative. In China,halal products are called qingzhen, meaning “pure and true.” Since there is nonational organization that officially certifies halal food and since the“halal” title symbolizes that certain food is prepared according to Muslimtraditions with generally stricter regulations than average Chinese food, thecertification process falls under local Islamic organizations like the ChinaIslamic Association. Driven by the high demand for halal food, the sector isgrowing rapidly, increasing 6.4% per year. Nevertheless, while the halal sectordoes provide a seemingly trustworthy alternative for domestic food products, ithas been controversial. Halal food has created a policy dilemma for the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP): to help promote halal business for economic purposes orto stick to an atheist set of socialist values. This dilemma is only furthercomplicated by the growing Islamophobic rhetoric heard on social media from HanChinese, who are deeply unhappy with China’s changing religious and economiclandscape.

A qingzhen certificate issued by the ChinaIslamic Association. https://flic.kr/p/9Jh97o

The growth of the halal sector hasindirectly led to growing Muslim influence in the northern province of Gansuwhere the ethnic population is predominately Hui, a Muslim minority. UnlikeXinjiang’s Uyghurs who speak a Turkish dialect, Hui Muslims speak Mandarin andare often indistinguishable from their non-Muslim neighbours when not wearingtheir burqas or white caps. The Hui people’s cultural differences stem fromtheir distinct culinary practices and religious beliefs. Halal businesses areoften started and run by these Hui minorities, who incorporate their religiouspractices into the preparation and marketing of food under the certification ofqingzhen. To acquire the certification, a unique procedure has to be performedby an imam who prays over the slaughtering of animals and conducts otherreligious rituals according to Quranic doctrine. This distinction prohibitsmany restaurants and businesses from acquiring the certification becauseMuslims want to preserve the holiness of their food. If non-Muslims want toapply for the certification, they must follow all the Quranic guidelinesdetailed by the China Islamic Association. Since some believe that the halalsymbol represents a safer food choice, many non-Muslim food industries want toincrease their competitiveness and attract more consumers by acquiring thecertification. Whether the owner of the business is Muslim or not, the halalsector has thus emerged as a competitive food provider in the Chinese economy.

This certification process, however, has sustainedcriticism due to its lack of regulation. Since there is no national standardfor the process, the granting of the certification is subject to the judgmentof local governments and sometimes local Islamic associations. Mandatoryreligious rituals during food preparation give some economic and politicalpower to imams, who supposedly only serve as religious leaders approved by theCCP. In some villages in Gansu, imams even have stronger cultural and religiousinfluence than the local government: they lead daily prayers, utilize moneyfrom the halal sector to build mosques, and encourage the study of the Quran inschools. This influence has even reached past imams’ original spheres ofinfluence in Muslim-populated regions.

This increasing religious influenceconflicts with the national policy of religion below the state. The CCP hasconsistently emphasized that all religious practices should be under stateregulation and that they cannot interfere with policymaking. Gansu and itsneighbouring autonomous region, Ningxia, seem to be diverging from the wishesof the CCP.

Hui Muslims praying inside a Chinesemosque. http://bit.ly/2GKjiTX

The growth of halal sector imposes twothreats and contradictions on national policies. Under President Xi, the halalsector has been subsidized and enjoyed tax-free zones to compete with neighbouringSoutheast Asian countries on the production of halal food. In addition, Xi’sBelt and Road Initiative has sought opportunities to establish bilateral tradeagreements with Muslim countries for halal business. These state policies haveallowed the sector to grow immensely, while the Party’s more atheist principlesmay contradict these economic incentives. The political status of Ningxia as a“Hui Autonomous Region” has further complicated policymaking. On one hand, Huiminorities are allowed self-rule and the practice of their beliefs; on theother, local governments are required to accomplish national mandates. Thecentral-local relationship between local officials and the state poses thequestion of whether the local officials should align themselves more withBeijing or associate themselves with local halal businesses who provide themwith economic benefits. This balancing game exposes the potential danger of theCCP losing its grasp over religious groups: if local officials bow to halalbusinesses’ economic interests, they may be giving a green light to theexpansion of religious organizations’ influence.

This potential danger has manifested itselfin widespread fear among the Han population that, if the halal sector keepsincreasing, China will witness an Islamizing movement justified by economicforces. The debate surrounding halal businesses and increasing Islamophobia wasparticularly heated in 2016 when the CCP was said to be consideringstandardizing halal business regulations due to several halal food scandalsafter 2013. Anti-Islam sentiments in regards to the rise of halal foods havemaintained momentum even until today. This trend on the internet is increasingcleavages between ethnic groups and possibly subjecting Muslim minorities hate speech.

With its religious influence expanding, thehalal sector has received much backlash on social media and from society. ManyHan Chinese have voiced their discontent with the growing presence of halalbusinesses in non-Muslim regions. The halal sector does not limit itself to thedairy and meat industry. Halal-only canteens have begun to appear in someuniversities; salt, soy sauce, and other necessities are becomingqingzhen-certified; and stories regarding Muslim segregationists circulate onsocial media. Meituan, a food delivery service, has adopted a Halal-onlydelivery box to expand its customers. This Meituan controversy has been viewedby some internet users as a plot to destroy national ethnic unity and advocatea Muslim identity above the rest of the population. One person wrote on Weibo,the Chinese version of Twitter, “Muslims need a separate box even for adelivery, you can see how they treat us, the non-Muslims one day… Meituan youare helping them to hinder us. I will never use your service.”

Similar and more violent posts can be foundonline. There are calls from Han communities to resist buyingqingzhen?certified products, and criticisms of officials in universities andlocal governments have been gaining momentum since 2017. Critics of halal foodhave gone so far as to accuse Muslims of betraying the core values of Chinesesociety, which currently centre around the new Xi Jinping Thought to create asocialist society with Chinese characteristics and with the Party as supremearbitrator. Within his rhetoric, President Xi has stressed that religionsshould be Sinicized and, therefore, serve the interests of the CCP.

With momentum growing, it has the potentialto turn violent, either online or in reality. This potential places thenational government in a critical position: choosing between supportingeconomic growth in the halal sector or addressing the grievances of the Hanpeople, who constitute more than 90% of the country’s population. During the19th Party Congress, President Xi demanded that China “actively guide religionsto adapt to the socialist society” and impose further regulation on religiousassociations. Nevertheless, this rhetoric seems unable to reconcile theconflicts between halal supporters and halal objectors. There is a lack ofactual regulation on the ground to curb halal business, and violentanti-Islamic posts are censored on the internet. The grievances of the peoplehave not been addressed properly since their calls for stricter regulations ofhalal businesses have not been answered by the State Religious Affairs Bureau.In fact, CCP has banned the use of anti-Islamic words online, and halal sectoris still expanding. The growing trend of Islamophobia and attacks on Muslimculture and values is extremely problematic; yet at the same time, the idea ofan Islamic “penetration” into China worries many Han Chinese. The CCP, unclearon whether it will draft regulations on the halal business, is becoming morerepressive in its rhetoric toward the Muslim minorities. How the CCP willdecide to balance its economic interests and atheist core values will determinewhether the growth of the halal industry or Islamophobic rhetoric will win thisround.

Posted by Lanya Feng

Link->https://www.mironline.ca/eating-pure-true-halal-businesses-china/